Democratic constitutional design and public policy : analysis and evidence / edited by Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg.
|出版者||Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press|
|大きさ||viii, 373 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.|
|内容注記||Introduction Rational choice politics and institutions Roger D. Congleton and Birgitta Swedenborg -- Direct democracy designing a living constitution Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer -- Constitutions and economic policy Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini -- Party-line voting and committee assignments in the mixed-member system Thomas Stratmann -- The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo -- On the merits of bicameral legislatures intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability Roger D. Congleton -- Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy John Charles Bradbury and W. Mark Crain -- Federalism a constitutional perspective Dennis C. Mueller -- Common tax pool problems in federal systems Brian Knight -- Judicial independence and economic development Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt -- Constitutions and prosperity the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations Randall G. Holcombe, Robert A. Lawson, and James D. Gwartney -- Amendment procedures and constitutional stability Bjørn Erik Rasch and Roger D. Congleton -- Designing constitutional stability Barry R. Weingast.|
|一般注記||Papers originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Center for Business and Policy Studies.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
|著者標目||Congleton, Roger D.
|件 名||Comparative government--Congresses.
Political science--Decision making--Congresses.
Rational choice theory--Congresses.
|電子体||Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence|